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Bringing human rights home: refugees, reparation, and the 
responsibility to protect
James Souter
Human rights, it is often observed, have become a common global language 
for making moral claims. One consequence of this is that there is a huge range 
of ways in which states, organisations and other actors draw on, invoke and 
mobilise human rights in different locations and contexts. The vast array of 
campaigns, treaties, laws and policies which fall under the umbrella of human 
rights means that human rights talk will be continually contested and, to 
some extent, fragmented, contradictory, and inconsistent. In Richard Wilson’s 
phrase, human rights discourse will remain strongly marked by ‘ideological 
promiscuity’ (Wilson 2006). Given that human rights talk and practice are 
partly shaped by power, these inconsistencies will inevitably, at least to some 
degree, reflect power relations and dominant interests within and across states. 
The existence of inconsistencies in some of the ways in which human 
rights are framed and put into practice has become more and more apparent 
to me in the years since I completed the MA in Understanding and Securing 
Human Rights in 2009. Liberal democratic states, such as the UK, profess their 
strong commitment to human rights principles. However, such states seem to 
tend towards the view that much of the business of human rights protection 
is something that should, or even can, only or mainly be provided beyond 
their borders. As Dan Bulley (2010, 43) has discussed, debates in such states 
often construct the ‘human’ in human rights as a subject which can ‘only be 
saved close to its territorially qualified home’, placing human rights squarely 
within the realm of foreign policy. When it comes to opening up the state to 
refugees, however, this commitment to human rights can come dangerously 
close to evaporating, given the range of measures used by Western states to 
prevent the arrival of asylum seekers and to limit the numbers of refugees they 
protect. This, it appears to me, is evident when we consider both efforts to 
achieve reparation and accountability for the harms suffered by refugees, and 
the ways in which states have framed the ‘responsibility to protect’ and sought 
to put it into practice. For the promise of human rights to be truly realised, I 
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will suggest, reparation for refugees and the responsibility to protect need to be 
fully ‘brought home’ to liberal democratic states and linked to the practice of 
granting asylum to refugees. 
Reparation and refugees
Reparation – whether in the form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction 
– is affirmed in international human rights treaties, and by the UN General 
Assembly, which adopted the Reparations Guidelines in 2005.1 Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), for instance, 
lays down a right to ‘an effective remedy’ for violations of the human rights 
therein. Refugees, fleeing as they often do from severe violations of human 
rights and being subjected to serious harm during perilous journeys, are clearly 
entitled to such reparation. However, where reparation has been linked to 
refugee protection in theory and practice, it has largely been in relation to 
refugees’ states of origin, and in the context of their repatriation (e.g. Bradley 
2013; Cantor 2011). This is partly appropriate, for many of the harms of 
displacement are perpetrated by refugees’ states of origin or by non-state actors 
within those states, and voluntary repatriation and reparations processes within 
these states – such as compensation, property restitution or truth-telling – can 
be the most fitting way of remedying the harms that refugees suffer.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that this is always the case. The static 
conception of protection as something that is possible only at, or near to, home 
has been reflected in what B.S. Chimni (1998, 360) has dubbed an ‘internalist’ 
approach to the causes of forced migration, which assumes that refugees’ states 
of origin are entirely or mainly responsible for refugees’ flight. Yet this internalist 
view ignores the clearly external causes of many contemporary cases of forced 
migration, whether as a result of military interventions, support for oppressive 
regimes, or the imposition of damaging economic policies. Interventions by 
Western states in Vietnam, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya in the past half-century, for 
instance, have produced huge numbers of refugees. 
Once these external causes of displacement are brought into view, it 
becomes much less clear why reparation is something that is owed only within 
refugees’ states of origin. As I have argued elsewhere, reparation for refugees is 
at times owed by states in the form of asylum (Souter 2014). When it comes 
to responsibilities towards refugees, the principle of reparation is often as 
applicable to refugees’ host states as it is to their states of origin. There is, 
however, little evidence that the implications of the principle of reparation for 
1 United Nations General Assembly (2005), Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (21 
March 2006), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/60/147 (accessed 27 August 2015).
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asylum are recognised by states, save for a few isolated initiatives. In any case, 
these have tended to prioritise refugees who have assisted external states in their 
interventions, such as Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who have 
worked for the US and UK, rather than offering asylum as reparation more 
broadly to those displaced by the receiving state’s own actions.
The responsibility to protect
While refugee protection has been an important part of the human rights 
culture that has developed since World War Two, humanitarian intervention 
has remained a more controversial means of potentially upholding human 
rights in grave humanitarian emergencies. Drawing on existing human rights 
and humanitarian law, states unanimously agreed at the UN General Assembly 
in 2005 that they bear a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) populations from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is 
primarily a responsibility of states to protect their own citizens, but it also 
involves assisting other states to fulfil their R2P, as well as, in the language 
of the World Summit Outcome Document, taking ‘collective action, in 
a timely and decisive manner’ when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect 
their populations from these four crimes.2 This may, but need not necessarily, 
involve military intervention.
As with the matter of reparation for refugees, R2P is generally viewed in 
liberal democratic states primarily as a foreign policy issue. In other words, 
although R2P has its roots in the same human rights tradition as refugee 
protection and reparation, they are not generally viewed holistically. While the 
tendency to conflate R2P with military intervention to protect human rights 
has been dwindling in recent years, and a wider range of preventive activities 
– including, for instance, early-warning systems alerting states to impending 
atrocities – have been placed under the banner of R2P, it is nevertheless still 
predominantly viewed as something that ‘we’ do ‘over there’, in far-off states 
wracked by violence. 
Yet the implications of R2P for states’ asylum policies are not difficult to 
make out. When atrocities are imminent or are already being committed, a very 
frequent response by people at risk is to flee. R2P is meant to protect individuals 
at risk from these atrocities, and an obvious means of doing so is through offers 
of asylum (Barbour and Gorlick 2008; Welsh 2014). While there is a strong 
case for seeing asylum as a core element of R2P as a matter of course, making 
this linkage becomes even more important when the traditional understanding 
of R2P as humanitarian intervention is an obstacle to the delivery of effective 
2 United Nations General Assembly (2005), World Summit Outcome Document, 15 
September, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), paras. 138 and 139, p. 30, 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60–1–E.pdf (accessed 27 
August 2015).
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protection to those at risk. Military action is not only dangerous – risking as it 
does inflaming already volatile situations yet further and creating a fresh round 
of refugees who are owed reparation – but it is not always politically possible, 
given that it may be vetoed at the UN Security Council, or voted down in 
national parliaments, as we have seen in relation to the on-going crisis in Syria.
The international community’s inaction in the face of atrocities committed 
as part of the Syrian civil war since 2011 has led some commentators to point 
to the failure – or even untimely death – of R2P. Yet this view betrays an 
overly narrow understanding of what R2P is and entails. Only if R2P is solely 
a matter of foreign policy does the current impasse over the crisis in Syria 
signify R2P’s demise. In response to this deadlock, states can approach R2P 
creatively and make the obvious links with the alternative of asylum (Gilgan 
2015). Rather than leaving the responsibility to protect Syrian refugees to 
already overburdened neighbouring states, such as Turkey, European states can 
partly discharge their own R2P to many of those refugees who are now in any 
case seeking to enter Europe in large numbers.
Linking R2P with the principle of reparation can also potentially help 
to make some headway in making R2P’s vision a reality. When R2P falls on 
other states to step in when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to fulfil their primary 
responsibility to their citizens, the fact that R2P is seen by states as a general 
responsibility, that is shared equally among all states, creates a collective action 
problem. This view of R2P as a diffuse, shared responsibility allows each state 
to claim to uphold R2P while not seeing it as its specific role to take action in 
any given situation. Assigning a special responsibility to protect to a particular 
state or states on the basis of the principle of reparation when there is a case 
for doing so can help to overcome this problem, and to ensure that effective 
action is taken to protect those at risk from atrocities (see Pattison 2010; Tan 
2006). For instance, as I have recently argued in an article with Jason Ralph, 
given that the 2003 invasion of Iraq destroyed the Iraqi state and rendered 
Iraqis highly vulnerable to external shock, which then materialised in the form 
of Islamic State in 2014, it is reasonable to argue that the US and other states 
which took part in the invading coalition, such as the UK and Australia, bear a 
‘special responsibility to protect’ that is more demanding than a merely general 
responsibility shared with all states, and includes an obligation to offer asylum 
to a larger number of Iraqi refugees (Ralph and Souter 2015). 
Thinking ‘outside the box’
There is a broader point to be made here about how academics study human 
rights, and the role of political frameworks and policy categories in their 
research. Many scholars in human rights and refugee studies are motivated 
by a desire to alleviate suffering and injustice, and are concerned to ensure 
that their research has a positive impact on efforts to protect human rights, 
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by raising awareness or influencing policy. In order to gain policy relevance, 
understandably academics often speak in the language that politicians and 
policy-makers understand. In doing so, however, there is a danger that they 
replicate and reinforce artificial divisions between elements of human rights 
law, policy and practice, such as those concerning reparation, asylum and R2P 
that I have highlighted here, that are more reflective of states’ interests than the 
needs of those at risk or the situations in which they find themselves. There 
is a danger that the uncritical use of policy categories can distort research on 
human rights and refugees, and limit its progressive potential (see Bakewell 
2008; Turton 2003). Scholars, for instance, have largely left unchallenged the 
view that reparation for refugees is a matter for refugees’ states of origin, or the 
idea that R2P is solely or largely a foreign policy issue. The desire for policy 
relevance needs to be coupled with a critical approach to policy categories and 
frameworks. Only then can academics and researchers help to overcome the 
inconsistencies and blind spots that currently beset some of the current efforts 
to understand and promote human rights.
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